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Liability Of Broker-Dealers For The Fraudulent Acts Of
Their Salesmen Under The Securities Act Of 1933
Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton'
Both the Securities Act of 19332 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 19343 were enacted to protect the investing public in securities
transactions.4 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in transmitting to
Congress his recommendation for legislation in this field, wrote: "This
proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine,
'Let the seller also beware'." 5 Accordingly, the statutes which Congress
enacted contain general anti-fraud provisions6 and sections which ren-
der a "controlling person" liable for the violations of the parties whom
he controls. 7
Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton,8 a recent decision of the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, indicates
that there is an uncertainty in the law pertaining to the liability of
"controlling persons" under the federal securities laws. In the Hutton
case, Trice Production Company, a Delaware corporation, employed,
in 1960, W.E. Hutton and Co., a stock brokerage partnership, to act
as its adviser, broker and agent in the sale of production payments9
for minerals to be extracted from certain oil and gas properties owned
by Trice. LaPiere, the manager of Hutton's oil and gas department,
was authorized to find purchasers for the production payments and to
1. CCH FED SEc. L. REP. ff 92,268 (D. Md. Aug. 15, 1968).
2. 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a to § 77aa (1964).
3. 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78a to § 78a-hh-1 (1964).
4. "The [1933] statute . .. was enacted to meet a growing need for the protec-
tion of investors from false and misleading statements by those interested in the sale
of securities, whether they be the issuing company, the underwriter or the broker."
Boehm v. Granger, 181 Misc. 680, 42 N.Y.S.2d 246, 248 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd per
curiam, 268 App. Div. 855, 50 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1st Dep't 1944).
In Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371, 373 (10th Cir. 1964), the
court said: "The purpose of the [1933] Act is to protect the naive or uninformed
investor and to deny recourse to the reckless or fraudulent seller of securities."
5. H.R. Doc. No. 12, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
6. Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act imposes liability for a materially mis-
leading or defective registration statement. 48 Stat. 82, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(1964). Section 12(1) imposes liability on anyone who offers or sells a security in
violation of the registration requirements of the Act. 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 771(1) (1964). Section 12(2) imposes liability on anyone who offers or
sells a security by means of a material misstatement or omission. 48 Stat. 84, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1964).
The anti-fraud section of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is § 10-b.
48 Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964). This section should be read in
conjunction with its corresponding rule, lOb-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968). How-
ever, Section l0b and Rule lOb-5 are beyond the scope of this Note and will not be
treated here.
7. Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1964).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20. 48 Stat. 899, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78t
(1964).
8. CCH FED. Sc. L. ReIp. J 92,268 (D. Md. Aug. 15, 1968).
9. A production payment represents an interest in oil and gas reserves to be
extracted from known wells. It is purchased for a lump sum in a single transaction.
The seller-operator extracts the oil and gas from the ground and pays the proceeds
over to the owner of the production payment. A production payment comes within the
term "security" as defined by Section 2(1) of the 1933 Securities Act. Johns Hopkins
Univ. v. Hutton, CCH FED. Szc. L. REp. 1 92,268, at 97,289 (D. Md. Aug. 15, 1968)
and cases cited therein.
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perform services incident to the sales. Through LaPiere, Hutton
offered to sell one of the production payments to Johns Hopkins
University. In the course of the transaction, LaPiere made material
misrepresentations to Hopkins concerning engineering estimates of the
oil and gas reserves from which the production payment was to be
paid. Relying on these misrepresentations, Hopkins purchased a pro-
duction payment in 1961. Hutton received a commission from Trice
as a result of the sale; part of the commission was paid to LaPiere.
When, during the following years, a number of wells did not pro-
duce satisfactorily, it became apparent to Hopkins that its original
expectations of return would not be met. In 1962, creditors forced
Trice into bankruptcy; as a result of investigations concerning the
bankruptcy proceedings, Hopkins became aware of the misrepresenta-
tions in the original sales presentation. Shortly thereafter, in 1963,
Hopkins filed suit against Hutton under the provisions of Section
.12(2) of the 1933 Act, seeking rescission of its purchase. The District
Court for the District of Maryland granted Hutton's motion for sum-
mary judgment,1" holding as a matter of law that material misrepre-
sentations and omissions had been made by Hutton in violation of
Section 12(2). The court reasoned that since Hutton was a "person
who sells a security" within the meaning of Section 12(2) and since
Hutton was responsible under common law principles of agency for
the acts of its employee, LaPiere, Hutton had violated Section 12(2).
SELLER'S AND BROKER'S LIABILITY UNDER THE
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act1 imposes liability, in the form of
rescission or damages,'12 on any person who offers or sells a security
by means of a material" misstatement or omission. The elements of
10. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
11. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2)
(1964). Section 12(2) provides:
Any person who-
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of
section 3, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) thereof), by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate com-
merce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication which
includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth
or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know,
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth
or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who
may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to
recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the
amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for
damages if he no longer owns the security.
12. Id. For a comparison of the common law action of rescission with § 12(2),
see 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1700 (2d ed. 1961). See generally Peterson,
Recent Developments in Civil Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act
of 1933, 5 HousToN L. Rv. 274 (1967).
13. Section 12(2) predicates liability upon a misstatement or omission of a material
fact. The term "material" when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of
information as to any subject, limits the information required to those matters as to
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proof required to establish liability under Section 12(2), however, are
different in some respects from those essential to the success of an
action for common law fraud. While the buyer, as under common law,
must show the falsity and materiality of the representation, the seller,
under Section 12, has the burden of proving his lack of knowledge of
the falsity and his inability to learn of the falsity through the exercise
of reasonable care. 4 Additionally, it has been held that a plaintiff need
not allege and prove reliance upon the misstatement or omission, or
any causal connection between his damages and the defendant's action.1 5
Section 15, the "controlling persons" provision of the 1933
Act, provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or
otherwise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agree-
ment or understanding with one or more other persons by or
through stock ownership, agency or otherwise, controls any person
liable under sections [11 or 12] of this title, shall also be liable
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such con-
trolled person to any person to whom such controlled person is
liable, unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or rea-
sonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason
of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist. 1 6
Thus, Section 15 liability is expressly limited to those who control
persons who would themselves be liable under Sections 11 or 12 of
the Securities Act of 1933. Sections 11 and 12 define the substantive
offense; the "controlling persons" section merely indicates additional
persons against whom liability for Section 11 or 12 violations can
be asserted. There is also a "controlling persons" provision in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 - Section 20."7 This section provides
for liability for anyone who controls a person who would himself be
liable under any provision of the 1934 Act. Like Section 15 of the
1933 Act, Section 20 does not impose liability if "the controlling per-
son acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the
act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action."'" Though
there are similarities in the operation of the two controlling persons
which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing
the security registered. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(1) (1968). For an interesting discussion
of the difference between "fact" and "opinion," see Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702
(9th Cir. 1961).
14. See Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108, 116 (10th Cir. 1959). Cf. Athas v.
Day, 161 F. Supp. 916, 918 (D. Colo. 1958); Wilko v. Swann, 127 F. Supp. 55, 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
15. Newberg v. American Dryer Corp., 195 F. Supp. 345, 352 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
16. Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1964).
17. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a), 48 Stat. 899, as amended, 15 U.S.C.§ 78t (1964)
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any persons liable under any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person
to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling
person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
constituting the violation or cause of action.
18. Id.
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provisions, the scope of this Note will be limited to a discussion of
Section 15, except where reference to Section 20 is necessary.
A recent law review article, in discussing the liability of a brok-
erage firm for its salesmen's fraudulent acts, articulated the follow-
ing argument:
Since it is clear that the relationship between a brokerage
firm and its salesmen is one of controlling person to controlled
person, it would appear that if the firm is to be held liable for the
wrongdoing of one of its salesmen the source of this liability
should rest in an application of a controlling person section. To
hold a passive, legitimate broker liable under the general anti-fraud
provisions renders the controlling persons sections superfluous,
and thereby deprives the firm of the defenses that these sec-
tions afford.'9
It is submitted that to hold a brokerage firm liable under Section
12(2) for the unlawful acts of its agents would not render the "con-
trolling persons" sections superfluous, since the legislative history of
these sections, and the cases applying them, indicate that these sections
were designed to establish a "controlling persons" liability that would
"supplement, and [extend] beyond common law principles of agency
and respondeat superior."2 Because Section 15 speaks of "control" by
"agency or otherwise," it is apparent that Section 15, by its terms,
reaches the employer-employee relation in the brokerage firm situation,
since the salesman is acting as the agent of the firm. However, this
does not necessarily mean that Section 15 is the exclusive standard
for imputing liability to a brokerage firm for the fraudulent acts or
omissions of its employee committed within the scope of his employ-
ment. In view of the purpose of the Securities Acts, another inter-
pretation of Section 15 seems more compelling: that Section 15 should
be applied only when it is necessary to invoke its premise of liability,
the element of control. It is not necessary, however, to invoke such
a premise where the employee of a brokerage firm acts fraudulently,
since his actions and his knowledge may be imputed to his employer
under common law agency principles. In such a situation, the liability
of the employer can be predicated directly upon Section 12.
If a brokerage firm is to be held liable under Section 12(2) for
the misrepresentations of its employees, it must be brought within the
statutory definition of "any person who offers or sells."' 21 Both the
anti-fraud sections and the "controlling persons" sections speak of the
duties and liabilities of a "person." This term is defined in the 1933
Act to include "corporations", "partnerships" and other legal entities22
19. Comment, Brokerage Firm's Liability for Salesman's Fraudulent Practices,
36 FORDHIAM L. REv. 95, 97 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
20. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, CCH FED. Snc. L. REP. 1 92,268, at 97,285
(D. Md. Aug. 15, 1968) (emphasis added).
21. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2)
(1964).
22. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(2), 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2)
(1964). A similar definition will be found in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 3(a) (9), 48 Stat. 882, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (9) (1964).
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and thus is not limited to natural persons. Although brokers are not
"sellers" insofar as title does not pass from them to purchasers, since
the case of Murphy v. Cad y,23 it has been settled that Section 12(2)
imposes liability for misrepresentations not only upon persons who
actually own securities, but also upon brokers who "sell" securities
owned by other persons.
In Hutton, therefore, the Maryland district court found that
Hutton was a "person who sells" within the meaning of Section 12 (2),
and that it was liable under that section for the acts of its agent,
LaPiere. The court based its finding on a strict agency theory, argu-
ing that: "[A] principal cannot escape liability for his agent's 'appar-
ently authorized' acts simply because the agent acted tortiously without
the authorization of the principal so to act and without the principal's
knowledge. '24 While Section 12(2) affords a defense to a seller who
can prove "that he did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known of [the] untruth or omission," it would appear
that, under the Hutton view of Section 12(2), both the tortious acts
and the guilty knowledge of the agent may be imputed to the broker-
employer, thus precluding the successful assertion of the defense. The
Hutton court noted the similarity of the Hutton case to Murphy v.
Cady.25 The courts in the Cady litigation, on both the trial and appel-
late level, concerned themselves with the question of whether or not a
broker could be a "seller" and did not expressly deal with the imputa-
tion of Section 12(2) liability to a brokerage firm principal for the acts
of its agent; nevertheless, the Cady case held the defendant partnership
firm liable under Section 12(2) for the wrongful acts of its employee.
On the other hand, the Hutton court distinguished 26 the case of
Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co.,27 in which a brokerage firm
was excused from Section 15 liability by the defense afforded "con-
trolling persons" under that section.2' The court explained: "[W]hile
23. 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939), aff'd, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 705 (1940). "We agree with the court below that Section 12(2) imposes a
liability for misrepresentations not only upon principals, but also brokers when selling
securities owned by other persons." 113 F.2d at 989. This position was adopted in
Wall v. Wagner, 125 F. Supp. 854, 858 (D. Neb. 1954), aff'd sub nor. Whittaker v.Wall, 226 F.2d 868 (8th Cir. 1955); Boehm v. Granger, 181 Misc. 680, 42 N.Y.S.2d246 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd per curiam, 228 App. Div. 855, 50 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1st
Dep't 1944).
24. CCH FED. Sec. L. Rrp. ff 92,268 at 97,284.
25. 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939), aff'd, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 705 (1940). The court in Hutton stated: "This case is not unlike Murphy v.Cady . . . where liability under Section 12(2) was imposed on defendants, fifteen in
number, who constituted a brokerage firm, because of certain false material statements
made by their head trader who was an employee and not a partner." CCH F41. SEc. L.
Rip. 92,268, at 97,284.
26. Id.:
This is not a case like Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co.... in which
the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's holding of ostensible authority
and quoted from and relied upon Restatement, Agency, Second, § 258, Comment cfor the proposition that "[a] principle is not liable in deceit for unauthorized
representations made to a person who has reason to believe that they are not of
the sort authorized."
27. 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967), rev'g CCH FED. Sxc. L. Rtp. f 91,565 (1964-66
Transfer Binder) (S.D. Cal. 1964), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
28. 382 F.2d at 697.
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this court accepts the factual basis set forth in Kamen, this court re-
spectfully does not believe that Section 15, relating to 'controlling
persons' applies to the employer (brokerage house)-employee relation-
ship."29  Since Hopkins did not sue Hutton under Section 15, and
Hutton did not rely on the Section 15 defense, the court's statement
is apparently dictum." This dictum, however, coupled with the hold-
ing of the case on the applicability of Section 12(2), reflects a view
that appears to conflict with that expressed by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in the Kamen decision.
The agency relationship in Kamen was similar to that in Hutton.
Kamen & Co., a limited partnership dealing both in securities listed
on national securities exchanges and other unlisted securities, hired
two registered representatives, Ross and Grossinger, on the basis of
their assurances that they could substantially expand Kamen's volume
of business by soliciting orders for listed securities from firms which
were not members of a registered securities exchange.3' Ross and
Grossinger devised a complicated scheme whereby they offered for sale
stock in a worthless corporation which they had formed. They solicited
business in stocks listed on a national exchange from non-member firms
by offering them in exchange "guaranteed" profits through illusory
transactions in the shares of the worthless corporation. During the six-
month operation of this scheme, Ross and Grossinger grossed over
$180,000 in commissions, and Kamen received and retained profits
from these transactions. 2 Paul H. Aschkar & Co. was a non-member
firm which purchased some of the worthless shares offered by Ross.
Upon discovering the fraudulent scheme, it sued Kamen in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California.3" The
29. CCH FtD. Sic. L. RjsP. 11 92,268, at 97,285. It appears that Judge Kaufman
was incorrect in this statement since Section 15 can apply to a brokerage firm
(employer) -employee relation if an agency relation exists since agency is listed as one
possible method of control under Section 15. It is the contention of this writer that
Section 15 and the defense allowed thereunder should be used in the broker-employee
relationship only when it is necessary to invoke its premise of liability. It is not
necessary to invoke such a premise where the employee of a brokerage firm violates
the Securities Act since his actions and his knowledge may be imputed to his employer
under common law agency principles.
30. "While this court notes the absence of any contention by Hutton's counsel
that the 'unless' provision of Section 15 provides a defense for Hutton, this Court is
herein treating the Section 15 question at length in view of the statements in Kamen,
supra, particularly since those statements apparently form the basis for the petition
for certiorari in Kamen and the grant of same by the Supreme Court." CCH FED.
Sec. L. Rip. 92,268, at 97,286.
31. Non-member broker-dealers often receive orders from their customers for the
purchase or sale of securities listed on a national exchange. See Brief for Petitioner
at 4. Paul H. Aschkar & Co. v. Kamen & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967), rev'g
CCH F10. Sc. L. Rtp. 1 91,565 (1964-66 Transfer Binder) (S.D. Cal. 1964), cert.
dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968). In order to execute such an order on an exchange,
the non-member broker-dealer must replace the order with a broker-dealer who is a
member of the exchange.
32. For its failure to detect or prevent the fraudulent activities of its employees,
Kamen & Co. was suspended from all stock exchanges for 10 business days by the
Securities Exchange Commission. Abraham Kamen, the managing partner, was sus-
pended from being associated with any broker or dealer for 90 days. See SEC Release
No. 7965 (Sept. 29, 1966), CCH F9D. Szc. L. RiP. ff 77,408 (1966-67 Transfer
Binder).
33. Paul H. Aschkar & Co. v. Kamen & Co., CCH F4D. Sec. L. REP. 1 91,565
(1964-66 Transfer Binder) (1964).
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plaintiff in Kamen relied on various provisions of the Securities Acts
of 1933 and 1934, among them Section 12 of the 1933 Act, and upon
the statutory and common law of California. The district court held
that the acts of Ross and Grossinger constituted violations of certain
provisions of the 1934 Act, of Sections 12 and 17"4 of the 1933 Act,
and of the anti-fraud principles of the statutory and common law of
the state. It also held the defendant Kamen relieved from "controlling
person'" liability by the defenses provided in the "controlling persons"
provisions of both acts.35 The court held, however, that Kamen and its
partners were vicariously liable to the plaintiff because Kamen's em-
ployees ". . . perpetrated the fraud heretofore described while acting
within the scope of their employment and in exercise of their ostensible
authority. '36 The court did not specify under what provisions or on
what theory the employees' liability was to be imputed to the employer.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that
the district court's finding of ostensible authority was clearly erroneous.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the guaranteed profit transactions
in which the plaintiff had participated were so unusual that they should
have put the buyer on notice that the transactions offered and the
promises made were unauthorized.3 7 The court, however, agreed with
the trial court that Kamen had neither induced the fraudulent acts of
its employees nor had knowledge or reason to know of those acts.
While the court held that Section 15 was applicable, it found that:
"Kamen, concededly a 'controlling person' is, however, not vicariously
liable for the acts of the agent under the Securities Act of 1933."' 3 s
The meaning of this quotation in particular, and of the court's opinion
in general, is unclear.
It is clear, however, that the Ninth Circuit feels that Section 15
applies to the broker-employer relation where there has been a Section
12 violation by the employee. It is equally clear that the court feels
that there can be no imputation of liability to a "controlling person"
outside of Section 15 where there is no actual or ostensible authority in
the employee to commit the tortious acts. It is not clear, however,
whether the circuit court opinion in Kamen may stand for something
more than this.
34. Section 17 of the 1933 Act deals with fraudulent interstate transactions.
It reads:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in inter-
state commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of an untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser ....
35. CCH FED. Stc. L. PUP. 91,565, at 95,137, 95,139. The court concluded that
the defendant lacked the requisite knowledge or reasonable grounds for knowledge
under Section 15, and that the defendant did not induce the fraudulent acts.
36. Id. at 95,139 (conclusion of law No. 10).
37. 382 F.2d at 696.
38. Id. at 697. The court did not specify exactly which provisions of the 1933
Act it was referring to. However, nowhere in the opinion is Section 12 mentioned;
the only section of the 1933 Act referred to is Section 15.
1969]
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The Hutton court apparently felt that the circuit court opinion in
Kamen might stand for the proposition that, even if there were actual
or ostensible authority in a brokerage employee to perpetrate Section
12 violations, nevertheless the liability of the brokerage firm should be
tested only under Section 15, with its concomitant defense. The
Hutton opinion states:
With regard to Section 12(2), the Ninth Circuit, referring to
Section 15 of the '33 Act and its '34 counterpart, stated in Kamen
that no liability under 12 (2) existed because the employer was not
"a participant" in the fraudulent activities of the employees, nor
did it have "any reasonable grounds for believing that such activity
was taking place."
While this court accepts the factual analysis set forth in
Kamen, this court respectfully does not believe that Section 15,
relating to "controlling" persons applies to the employer (broker-
age house)-employee relationship."9
Whether Kamen stands for the proposition or not, there is a possible
view,4" contrary to that expressed in Hutton, that in regard to the
brokerage-employee relationship, the provisions of Section 15 of the
1933 Act and the "controlling persons" provisions of the 1934 Act, with
their concomitant defenses, pre-empt the field, so to speak, whether or
not there may have been an actual or ostensible agency relationship.
It is the thesis of this Note that such a view is incorrect. It is sub-
mitted that the Hutton court was correct where, when Section 12 was
found to have been violated by brokerage firm employees, it tested the
brokerage-employee relationship to see if actual or ostensible authority
existed in the agent and, having found such authority, imputed Section
12(2) liability to the brokerage firm employer despite a lack of knowl-
39. CCH FD. SEc. L. Rim. 92,268, at 97,284-85. The court in Kamen stated:
In support of the above contention, cross appellant cites several cases where
the employer was held liable for the acts of his employee where the particular
activity was deemed non-delegable. Such cases may be valid propositions of law
but they have no application to actions maintained under the Securities Acts.
Aschkar sought relief under the Securities Act of 1933. Section 15 of the Act(15 U.S.C. § 77o), known as the "Controlling Persons" provision and applicable
here, predicates liability upon the controlling person, "unless the controlling person
had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts
by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist." Wehave already concurred with the trial court in its finding that Kamen was neither
a participant, directly or indirectly, in the fraudulent activities of Ross and
Grossinger nor did Kamen have any reasonable ground for believing such activities
were taking place. Kamen, concededly "a controlling person" is, however, not
vicariously liable for the acts of the agent under the provisions of the Securities
Act of 1933.
Relief was also sought under Sections 10 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1934(15 U.S.C. §§ 78j and 78o) and rules promulgated thereunder. Like the SecuritiesAct of 1933, the 1934 Act contains a "Controlling Persons" provision, Section 20(15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)). The test of liability there for the controlling person is
that he must have acted in bad faith and directly or indirectly induced the conduct
constituting a violation or cause of action. Kamen, as a controlling person, is
not liable under this section for reasons already noted.
382 F.2d at 697 (emphasis added).
40. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
[VOL. XXIX
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY V. HUTTON
edge or cause for knowledge in the broker, precluding the availability
of that defense by imputing the agent's wrongful knowledge to the
employer. On the other hand, it is contended that Hutton is incorrect
where it totally denies the applicability of Section 15 to the brokerage-
employee relation. It is contended that Section 15 and the other "con-
trolling person" provisions, with their defenses, should be applied to
the brokerage-employee relationship where liability under common law
principles cannot be imputed.4'
Because the brokerage firm is a "seller" within the purview of
Section 12(2) under the Cady rationale and because the firm is also
the employer of the malefactor and, thus, is liable for his actions under
common law principles of vicarious liability,42 the firm, in the Hutton
situation, will be subject to liability under Section 12(2). There is
no inequity in such a position. The firm hires the employee, has the
responsibility of supervising his work and, ultimately, puts the em-
ployee in a position to defraud. In most instances, the firm benefits
from its employee's violation of the Securities Act.43 Finally, a pur-
chaser is entitled to meaningful protection under the Securities Act
for fraud committed by an employee in pursuance of his employer's
business purpose. The Securities and Exchange Commission has en-
dorsed this position in its administrative disciplinary proceedings, con-
sistently ruling that a violation of the securities laws by officers or
employees of a brokerage firm, acting within their scope of employment,
is a violation by the firm itself and that the degree of fault on the part
of the broker-dealer is relevant only in determining the sanction to
be imposed.44
It could be argued that this imposition of liability on the basis of
the agency relationship alone, regardless of the degree of culpability
of the brokerage firm, is at war with the intention of Congress, ex-
pressed at the time the defense provisions were added to Section 15,
that "the mere existence of control," in itself, should not be enough to
impose liability.45 This contention is adequately disposed of by the
observation that when a brokerage firm entrusts its employees with
authority to deal with the public, for the profit of the firm, in trans-
actions which involve potential liability far in excess of the employees'
41. Since a corporation or a partnership cannot itself have knowledge of facts,
have reason to know facts, or act in good faith, the defenses of these sections can be
applied to such legal entities only to the extent that knowledge, reason to know or
good faith of certain individuals is imputed to them. None of the sections provide
any means for identifying these individuals. It appears that the type of individual
required and whether the burden is met can only be determined on the facts in a
case by case analysis.
42. RESTATEMPNT (SzcoND) or AGtNCY § 257 and comment b (1957). See Id.§ 261 and comment a.
43. See, e.g., text accompanying note 32 supra.
44. See, e.g., Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961) ; H.F. Schroeder &
Co., 27 S.E.C. 833, 837 (1948) ; E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 379 (1945).
The Commission is also authorized to proceed directly against individual officers of
a firm who have failed to adequately supervise wrongdoers within the firm. 15 U.S.C.
§ 780(b) (5) (E) (1964). See note 32 supra.
45. H.R. CONE. lEP. No. 1838 on H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1934)(emphasis added). Until this amendment there was no defense provided for a
"controlling person."
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individual financial resources, there is more involved than the "mere
existence of control."46
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The legislative history of Section 15 of the 1933 Act and of
Section 20 of the 1934 Act contains considerable support for the view
that the "controlling persons" standards were not primarily intended
to govern the normal employer-employee relationship.
The legislative history of Section 15 indicates that Congress in-
tended the "controlling persons" provisions to reach those persons who
had exercised control over wrongdoers even though, under common
law principles of agency, the particular nature of the control exercised
might be insufficient to give rise to the traditional operation of vicarious
liability. In reviewing Section 15 shortly after the 1933 Act was
passed, Mr. Justice (then Professor) Douglas and Professor Bates
wrote: "By virtue of Section 15, however, the so-called 'dummy'
director is cast aside and those are held liable who tell him how to
act and what to do." 47
The original Senate version of the 1933 Act contained a number
of provisions designed "to aid in preventing directors from evading
46. See Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 21-24, Paul H. Aschkar & Co. v.
Kamen & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967), rev'g CCH FED. SEc. L. RNP. f 91,656(1964-66 Transfer Binder) (S.D. Cal. 1964), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).
It is a well established proposition that a business entity may be held civillyliable in damages for the acts of its officers or employees when done within the scope
of their employment. The policy underlying this principal is:
The business entity cannot be left free to break the law merely because its owners,
stockholders . . . [or] partners . . .do not personally participate in the infraction.
The treasury of the business may not with impunity obtain the fruits of violations
which are committed knowingly by agents of the entity in the scope of their
employment.
United States v. A.&P. Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 126 (1958) ; accord, New York
Central R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). It was argued by the SEC in
Kamen that:
It is the firm that is accepting and retaining the profits from the transactions,
as Kamen and Co. did in this case; and it is the firm to whom the customer
should be permitted and expected to look if his trust has been abused.
When a securities firm confers upon its employees the authority to engage in
transactions far beyond the financial resources of the individual employees, public
investors should not be required to ponder whether that firm has also given those
employees confidential instructions limiting that authority or be required to abstain
from participation in a securities transaction without first consulting a managing
partner to ascertain the metes and bounds of the authority of the firms' repre-
sentative. Members of the investing public who deal with a securities firm should
be entitled to assume that the firm will stand behind the conduct of the employees
it retains to deal with the public when they act within the scope of their employ-
ment. A broker-dealer's responsibility for the acts of its employees could not
be expressly waived by the customer. Neither should an indirect waiver be sanc-
tioned in the form of an unwarranted duty of investigation. At the very least, an
ordinary public investor who relies on the representations of an employee should
never be held to a duty to determine at his peril the extent of the employee's
authority, vel non, to obtain his participation in a particular transaction.
Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 23-24, Paul H. Aschkar & Co. v. Kamen
& Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1967).
47. Bates & Douglas, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALt L.J. 171,
196 (1933).
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the liabilities incident to signing the registration statement .. ."48
This draft of the Act made the fraudulent use of a "dummy" signer
of a registration statement unlawful.49 The House version of the bill,
which contained registration and anti-fraud provisions quite similar to
those eventually adopted, contained no sections expressly dealing with
either "dummies" or with "controlling persons."5 In conference, these
"dummy" provisions, which were calculated to place liability upon the
person who exercised actual control over the "dummy" irrespective of
whether a direct agency relationship existed, "[were] welded into one
and incorporated as a new section in the substitute."'" This "new
section" is now the "controlling persons" provision - Section 15. It
appears, then, that Section 15 was the result of congressional concern
with the special problem presented by the use of "dummies" and was
not designed to govern the usual employment situation.
In describing the provision that eventually became Section 20(a),
Thomas C. Corcoran, one of the authors of the 1934 Securities Ex-
change Act, testified: "The purpose is to prevent evasion of the pro-
visions of the section by organizing dummies who will undertake the
actual things forbidden by the section. '5 2 Although the 1934 Act always
contained provisions for the regulation of broker-dealers, Section 20(a)
was not thought to have relevance in that context. Richard Whitney,
President of the New York Stock Exchange in 1933, stated that
"[t]hese provisions seem to apply more particularly to corporations
and officers, directors and stockholders of corporations than to ex-
changes or brokers."5 3
In reference to what eventually became Section 20 of the 1934
Act, the House conference report stated: "[W]hen reference is made
to 'control' the term is intended to include actual control as well as
what has been termed legally enforceable control."5 4 Thus, it appears
that Congress intended the "controlling persons" provisions, Section 15
of the 1933 Securities Act and Section 20 of the 1934 Securities Ex-
change Act, "to establish a 'controlling person' liability which would
48. S. R'. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933). This language was concerned
with the possibility of a director avoiding the statutory liabilities attached to his sign-
ing the registration statement, by using another person as a front. See generally 3 L.
LOSS, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1721 (2d ed. 1961).
49. "Dummy" was defined as "a person who holds legal or nominal title to any
property, but is under a moral or legal obligation to recognize another as the owner
thereof; or a person who has the nominal power or authority to act in any capacity
but is under moral or legal obligation to act therein in accordance with the direction
of another." S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(k) (1933). The Senate bill
required the "dummy" signer to disclose his capacity and the identity of his
principal or principals; it provided that the dummy's signature would be invalid unless
accompanied by that of his principal, and, in the provision which eventually became
17 (a), it made it unlawful to employ a dummy to defraud, providing that both the
dummy and the principal would be violators. Id. at §§ 4, 13.
50. H.R. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
51. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 152 on H.R. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933).
52. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency on S. Res. 84
(72d Cong.) and S. Res. 56 & 57 (73d Cong.), 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6571 (1933).
53. Id. at 6639.
54. H.R. RE. No. 1383 on H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934). In referring
to the provision which eventually became § 20 of the 1934 Act, the committee stated:
"It was thought undesirable to attempt to define the terms. It would be difficult if
not impossible to enumerate or anticipate the many ways in which actual control may
be exerted." Id.
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supplement and [extend] beyond common law principles of agency and
respondeat superior.
' ' 5
From an examination of the legislative history of the 1933 Act,
it seems that the primary concern was to prevent avoidance of the pro-
visions of the Act through the use of holding companies or judgment-
proof corporations and to place financial responsibility for violations
upon those who had exercised "actual control" even if it was not
"legally enforceable control" under concepts of vicarious liability which
existed at the time.5"
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE "CONTROLLING
PERSONS" PROVISIONS
Many of the cases which have interpreted the "controlling persons"
provisions have applied them to carry out the congressional purpose of
reaching "control" wherever it exists. None of the cases have applied
those provisions to a brokerage firm-employee relationship, where the
employee's acts can be imputed back to the brokerage firm under
familiar agency or respondeat superior concepts.
In Hutton, the court stated:
Nor do any of the cases, other than Kamen, in which Section
15 is mentioned, indicate in any way that Section 15, and more
particularly the "unless" provision thereof, have any application
to the liability of a brokerage house for acts or omissions of its
employees. Rather, Section 15 has been applied in other contexts.
For instance, Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F.2d 868 (8th Cir. 1955)
imposed liability on a sales representative of an issuing corpora-
tion and on the president of that corporation; and Hawkins v.
Merrill Lynch, et al., 85 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Ark. 1949) applied
Section 15 and held Merrill Lynch, et al., liable for activities of
one of its Alabama "correspondents." 57
55. CCH F4D. Stc. L. Rzp. ff 91,268, at 97,285. Bernard Flexner, a prominent
securities law attorney wrote:
Consider for example, the innocent-looking suggestions to eliminate section
15 - the very heart of the Act - which holds liable any person controlling any
other person who is liable under the Act [Sections 11 and 12] .... Such an
elimination would practically repeal the Act, by the simple device of organizing
judgment proof subsidiaries, all flotations could be effected by the real parties in
interest with complete escape from the liabilities of the Act.
Flexner, The Fight on the Securities Act, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb., 1934, at 237,
reprinted in 78 CONG. Rzc. 523, 525 (1934).
56. See Comment, The Liability of Directors and Officers For Misrepresentations
in the Sale of Securities, 34 CoLuM. L. Rzv. 1090 (1934). In discussing the state of the
law at that time, the author wrote:
[I]mmunity from liability for written representations made in a corporate state-
ment is available at common law to any director or officer who did not take an
active part in, or sanction, its preparation or issuance. Nor is he answerable for
misrepresentations made by a co-director or an agent of the corporation, unless
there is authorization or ratification.
Id. at 1092.
57. CCH FMD. Szc. L. RP. 92,268, at 97,285. In Hawkins v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Beane, 85 F. Supp. 104, 123 (W.D. Ark. 1949), the court said:
The court does not believe that in using the word "controls" the Congress intended
that degree of control or the right to direct necessary to make out a common law
relationship of principal-agent or employer-employee, but the fact that Waddy was
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Other cases show a similar application of the "controlling persons" sec-
tions: for example, in Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis,5" the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit explained: "The
statute does not define 'controls,' 'controlled,' or 'controlling.' These
terms should be given "a broad definition to permit the applicable
provision of the Act to become effective wherever the fact of control
actually exists."59 In Smith v. Bear,60 a jury found the necessary
''control" present in informal relationships which were maintained by
friends and relatives of the directors of one company with the directors
of another company. The jury also found, however, that the "con-
trolling" company had acted in good faith and thus was not liable
under Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act. The court in Schamber v.
Aaberg,6 ' held that a husband and wife who were members of a board
of directors which consisted of only three persons were "controlling
persons" within the meaning of the Securities Act.
Thus, the cases seem to use the "controlling persons" sections when
no agency relationship exists. Such an application of those provisions
appears to be consistent with the congressional purpose of expanding
liability through the use of the concept of control. In the typical
brokerage firm situation, both Section 12 and Section 15 could be
applied to impose liability on the firm for the misrepresentations or
omissions of an employee. But to apply Section 15 to the exclusion
of the provisions of Section 12(2) is to unduly narrow the protection
provided by the federal securities laws. Rather it would seem more
consistent with the purpose of these acts to first test the relationship
under Section 12(2) to determine if an agency relationship exists.
If no such agency relationship is present, then the provisions of Section
15 could be brought to bear. Such a two-step application best provides
the protection to the investor that the securities acts were intended
to give. This legislative purpose can best be advanced by holding those
engaged in the securities business to a rigorous standard of responsi-
bility for the fraudulent activities of their employees.
THE SITUATION TODAY
The SEC, in its 1962 Annual Report, stated:
Concomitantly with the influx of a large number of new and
presumably inexperienced investors into the market, there has
been an influx of new and inexperienced salesmen. At the same
time, the increase in the number of branch offices has tended to
result in less effective supervision of the salesmen. The problem
not the agent of the defendants, either actual or by estoppel, does not affect the
statutory liability of the defendants. Keeping in mind the end to be achieved
by the legislation, the facts in the instant case, in the opinion of the Court, bring
these defendants within the term "controls" as used by Section 78t(a) [Section
20(a), the controlling persons provision of the 1934 Act].
58. 251 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1957).
59. Id. at 275.
60. 237 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1956).
61. 186 F. Supp. 52 (D. Colo. 1960).
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of supervision is aggravated by the employment of part-time sales-
men and salesmen who operate from their private "residences." 6
It would follow, logically, that with the supervision of employees de-
creasing and the number of inexperienced investors growing, the
opportunities for fraud by salesmen and other brokerage firm em-
ployees should be on the increase. It is not unfair to require brokerage
firms doing business under such circumstances, as a cost of doing
business, to make whole any investor who is defrauded by one of its
employees. 63 Because the Securities Acts were intended to enlarge
rather than restrict common law liability,64 imposing liability upon a
broker-dealer for the frauds of its employees does not offend the pur-
pose of those Acts. Indeed, it furthers that purpose. The "controlling
persons" provisions should be applied only where necessary to invoke
their expanded scope of liability and should not be used where liability
can be determined directly under Section 12(2) and traditional agency
concepts applicable thereto.
62. SEC 27th Annual Report 1 (1962).
63. This was conceded by the attorneys for Kamen & Co. in their brief in opposi-
tion to certiorari where they said: "Kamen & Co. already had the duties of an em-
ployer and would be liable for its employee's conduct if there was actual or apparent
authority for that conduct." See also Jackson, Stock Broker's Liability Under Customs
Usages and Rules, 12 CLtv.-MAR. L. Rev. 111, 112 n.4 (1963).
64. Congress expressly made the liability provisions in the securities acts more
liberal than the common law; e.g., proof of scienter and reliance are not required under
Section 11 or 12(2) of the 1933 Act. See notes 11-15 supra and accompanying text.
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